Composing, Researching and Ways of Talking by Croft, J
Composing, researching, and ways of talking
John Croft
Ways of talking have effects. What are the effects of talking about composition as if it were a form 
of research? What is the purpose of talking like this? What is gained? Should we be suspicious that 
this way of talking emerges from an imposed bureaucratic necessity? If I am composing music, 
does thinking of it as research help in any way? Or does it distort our understanding of what 
composing is? These, rather than matters of definition, are the important questions. As Ian 
Hacking writes, ‘[d]on’t ask for the meaning, ask what's the point.’1
Camden Reeves, in his response to my article ‘Composition is not Research’, goes to great lengths 
to decry the search for definitions, although I make no attempt at definition.  Most concepts work 2
not in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but in terms of exemplars, paradigms, and 
shared characteristics. My attempt to characterise a crucial difference between two types of activity 
does not entail a search for definitions.
Reeves focusses on ‘scientific method’. It’s an odd line of attack, as my article does not mention 
scientific method. It’s hard to say why Reeves ascribes to me some kind of scientistic outlook, but 
the result is that most of his objections are wide of the mark. I drew some examples from science, 
but my points have nothing to do with methodology. Of course, science does enjoy a certain 
paradigmatic status, and an entirely disjunctive concept is not really a concept, so we would expect 
some resemblances between scientific and non-scientific research. Many of the disanalogies 
mentioned in the second half of Reeves’s article are surely disanalogies not just with scientific 
research but with any useful notion of research. I find nothing to disagree with here – indeed, 
much of it echoes my own points – but leaves me wondering what there is to be salvaged in the 
idea of ‘composition as research’.
Because of its paradigmatic status, scientific method – or rather, an idea of scientific method that 
exists mainly in the minds of humanities academics – is often the first port of call when trying to 
make something look researchy. This is fundamentally misguided, since scientific discovery is very 
often haphazard and unsystematic:  it is only in the verification of such discoveries that method 
becomes crucial – yet, as I have argued, it is precisely this stage that is missing in composition. The 
fact that efforts to make composition look like research often emphasise methodology is the 
symptom of a deeper incompatibility between composition and research. It is precisely because of 
this incompatibility that its proponents often reach for the most obvious paradigm.
My point, then, is not about method. It is that the idea of composition-as-research implicitly 
ascribes qualities to composition which it cannot have – just as, as Gilbert Ryle argued, the idea of 
mind as a kind of substance involves ascribing to it properties that cannot possibly apply to what is 
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in fact a collection of dispositions and aptitudes. A category error brings with it not just the wrong 
questions, but the wrong sort of questions. (It is not really about fixity versus ‘boundlessness’, as 
Reeves suggests.)3
My main points can be understood in terms of two ideas: intentionality and corrigibility. Let us 
take intentionality first. This is the quality of ‘aboutness’: paradigmatically, language has 
intentionality because it is about something that is not itself language – ideas, objects, and so on. In 
our normal way of talking, research has this quality: ‘what is your research about?’ is a meaningful 
question and we would normally expect a researcher to be able to give some kind of answer. What 
kind of answer might a composer give to that question (other than a quizzical look)? One might 
perhaps describe a compositional problem that one is trying to solve. Or one might simply be 
trying to think of what comes next (although ‘I’m researching what note should come next’ would 
be a strange way of talking). In both cases the thought is directed to musical material and 
structure. If we want to call this research, then it is a special kind of research that is about itself. 
Moreover, this does not align with the intentionality commonly attributed to music: rarely would 
we say that a piece is primarily about some compositional problem. Rather, a piece might find 
solutions to compositional problems, while being about something else – outlooks, emotions, inner 
life, or whatever. Thus, compositional research would not only be reflexive, but would have an 
intentional object of a different kind to that normally attributed to pieces of music, which are 
nonetheless in some sense (according to Reeves) ‘the research’.
The second point is to do with corrigibility. This was the point of my invented compositional 
‘research questions’, whose answer is always (trivially) ‘yes’. This problem is not solved by 
changing the grammar of the question to ‘how’, with the piece itself as the answer: this manoeuvre 
merely replaces a trivial ‘yes’ with a trivial ‘like this’. The point remains: what counts as getting it 
right – not musically right (which is a matter for aesthetic judgment) but right in some ‘research’ 
sense? This point does not depend, as Reeves implies, on a scientific model of research. It is, rather, 
a question of evidence and criteria. Whether you are in the laboratory, in the library, or at the 
archaeological dig, there are criteria at work which allow you – and others in the field – to assess 
whether your evidence supports your conclusions. This does not mean that the criteria are 
absolute, or that they can be exhaustively specified in advance, but that anyone working in a given 
field will know what it means to produce evidence that confirms, falsifies, or corrects an earlier 
piece of research. A musicologist suggesting that a certain type of rubato was used in mid-
nineteenth-century piano music, or a literary theorist advancing a new interpretation of a play, 
must still provide evidence, and that evidence can be assessed by others in the field according to 
shared criteria. Research in the humanities might be more about ‘narratives’, as Reeves suggests, 
but narratives are still open to correction or refutation.
This does not entail that the idea of ‘research’ is unproblematic for all other academic disciplines. 
In particular, philosophy encounters some, but not all, of the problems I have identified for 
composition as research, and to that extent ‘research’ is also a problematic term for philosophy 
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(which, like music, predates the very idea of research). New philosophical ideas do not necessarily 
displace older ones, even when they are incompatible. On the other hand, the fact that we can say 
that they are incompatible suggests some kind of corrigibility (we would not describe pieces of 
music as ‘incompatible’), and there are philosophical views which are held at one time and later 
shown to be unsatisfactory. The fact that a discipline like philosophy sits uneasily with some 
aspects of the idea of ‘research’ hardly undermines the argument that composition sits even 
more uneasily.
We might use the expression ‘condition-governed corrigibility’ for the property of research 
whereby its results are open to correction, refutation, falsification, and so on, discursively by 
means of evidence and criteria. (I take the expression ‘condition-governed’ from Sibley,  who 4
argues that aesthetic terms are not ‘condition-governed’, meaning that there are no (non-aesthetic) 
conditions for their application.)  If I claim that Nebuchadnezzar II built the Hanging Gardens of 
Babylon, we know what kind of evidence we would accept (inscriptions, for example) and we 
know how we would test those pieces of evidence (dating the inscriptions, analysing the language 
used on them, etc.). Evidence does not have to be empirical – to test the proof of Fermat’s theorem, 
we would go through the mathematical deductions looking for errors, or perhaps attempt our own 
proof of its negation. Compositional decisions are not like this. This is not to say that there is no 
such thing as rightness and wrongness in such decision-making, but that we do not have the 
means of demonstrating the value of these decisions that are available to empirical or deductive 
claims. Kant’s view of aesthetic judgement (which he called ‘judgments of taste’) as subjective yet 
normative gets at this point – the normativity (or universality as he calls it) means that it is not just 
a matter of personal preference (or ‘agreeableness’ in Kant’s terms) – but the subjectivity of such a 
judgment means that we cannot adduce empirical evidence or argumentation in order to support 
our judgment. Indeed this is one of the main things that distinguishes the domain of the aesthetic.
The distinction at work here, loosely put, is between discovery and invention.  Before my critics 5
leap on this statement with accusations of essentialism or definition-mania, let me repeat that an 
attempt to characterise something is not an essentialising move – it is, however, an attempt to get 
at a fundamental difference between two types of activity: describing and presenting; making and 
finding out; or, in Aristotelian terms, poiēsis and epistēmē. It’s hardly a new idea, and deserves more 
than the breezy dismissal it receives, both from Reeves and from Ian Pace in his response.  Einstein 6
was not just ‘making something’. He was describing the world. A composer, on the other hand, is 
making an addition to the world that is not primarily descriptive. (And no, not like a smartphone 
or a blancmange. )7
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Pace is right that my article does not engage with the existing literature on ‘practice as research’. 
This is a burgeoning area, and there is no space here to discuss the examples he gives, except to 
note that such technical and background historical research has no bearing on my original 
argument. But I shall take this opportunity to make a few observations about the output of the 
practice-as-research industry. Much of it begins from the institutional imperative of casting artistic 
practice as research, and then proceeds to a ‘how-to’ guide. Where a (non-institutional) justification 
of the idea of practice-as-research is attempted, one can discern two types of argument. First, there 
is the argument from an extended concept of knowledge, as used for example by Robin Nelson in 
his introduction to Practice as Research in the Arts.  The idea here is that if we recognise the 8
legitimacy of ‘embodied’ knowledge, ‘material’ thinking, and so on, then we can have practice-as-
research. The second type of argument, deployed for example by Helga Nowotny in her foreword 
to the Routledge Companion to Research in the Arts, depends on the idea that scientific research is 
more like art than we have traditionally supposed.  On the one hand we have the argument that 9
art has more to do with knowledge than we had thought; on the other, we have the argument that 
science is more like art than we thought (so if it can be ‘research’, why not art?).
The latter line of argument often appeals to ‘Science and Technology Studies’ (STS), which 
emphasises the role of social forces – power relations, alliances, funding, and so on – in the practice 
of science. The proponent of STS most often cited is Bruno Latour, who, in much of his work, 
regards results in science as primarily the result of socio-historical relations and processes. Latour 
thinks that scientists’ agreement on a certain theory is prior to the observation that confirms it: 
observation is made to fit theory, rather than the other way around. He seems to believe this in a 
very strong sense – for example, he argues that Ramesses II could not have died of tuberculosis, as 
tuberculosis was only discovered in 1882. According to Latour, Robert Koch in some sense created 
tuberculosis in 1882, so before then nobody could have died from it.10
It is easy to see how this kind of thing lends itself to an extension of the concept ‘research’ to 
include creative practice. If researchers are really shaping the world to match a theory that is 
preferred for other reasons, then research does indeed start to look more like art. Estelle Barrett 
writes that ‘Bruno Latour suggests that science is a process of amassing inscriptions in order to 
mobilise power.’  These inscriptions ‘refer to each other, rather than material realities’.  In 11 12
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Barrett’s chapter, this becomes a justification for regarding creative processes as a form of research 
– after all, science is also a creative process.
This is not the place to launch a critique of STS, but I do think practice-as-research is in trouble if it 
depends on a view of science that confuses ideas and things so profoundly. However, Pace seems 
to espouse a version of this view in his suggestion that, if Einstein had not come up with relativity, 
someone else might have come up with an ‘entirely different paradigm’ instead.  Most physicists 13
would find this idea absurd.
The other argument appeals to forms of knowledge that are not discursive or propositional. This is 
often done with reference to Merleau-Ponty, who employed the idea of ‘savoir de familiarité’ in his 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945). Alternatively, one might enlist Gilbert Ryle and his insistence 
that knowledge-how is irreducible to knowledge-that.  Versions of this idea form the basis of 14
many of the articles that Pace mentions.  The idea of non-propositional and non-discursive 15
knowledge is not new. It is arguably present in the Aristotelian account of the distinction between 
epistēmē and tekhnē. So one might well ask why Robin Nelson, in his preface to Practice as Research 
in the Arts, tells us that practice-as-research entails a ‘shift in established thinking about what 
constitutes research and knowledge’.  Why does he write of ‘intelligent practice’ as if artists were 16
previously being unintelligent?17
In any case, one might propose a concept of ‘embodied research’ to go with ‘embodied 
knowledge’. If ‘research’ is the creation of knowledge, then one could say that, while knowing how 
to do something that someone already knows how to do (like ride a bicycle) is not research, 
working out how to do something that nobody else knows how to do is a kind of ‘researching-
how’. What is researching-how in musical composition? It can’t, of course, be how to write music. 
Nor can it be how to write the particular piece of music that I’m writing – that would be trivial. But 
might ‘how to write in sonata form’ might be knowledge-how that was created by Haydn and his 
contemporaries? Could ‘how to write music using twelve-note technique’ be knowledge-how 
created by Schoenberg? ‘Reseaching-how’ would then simply be a newfangled expression for the 
kind of formal or technical innovation in music that has happened throughout the history of 
western music.
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Schoenberg articulated the principles of twelve-note music, but Haydn could not have written a 
research narrative about being a pioneer of sonata form. The difference between the particular 
originality of a given piece and a formal innovation is often only apparent in retrospect, and is 
rarely the work of one person. Nor can it be just an arbitrary innovation – say, writing music based 
on genetic sequences, or playing the viola on a trapeze – this tends to revert to the type of trivial 
answer to a research question that I discussed in my original article. It would be a pretty tall order 
for most compositional work, and covers only one aspect of compositional originality. It certainly 
wouldn’t necessitate a body of literature such as that on ‘practice as research’. But if you want to 
say that composers throughout history who have come up with formal innovations have been 
doing ‘research’ without calling it that, then go ahead.18
Pace, at one point, agrees that composition is ‘not intrinsically research’, but that it might entail 
various activities that are research.  If this is his view, we do not disagree; this is exactly what I 19
said in my original article. But at another point he states that ‘research’ is just a word for what 
composers have always been doing, except for the additional requirement of supporting text. One 
interpretation of this might be that composition is research, and the text simply points out how – 
but this would contradict the earlier statement that composition is not intrinsically research. 
Another would be that composition is not research until turned into research by the text. This 
certainly doesn’t square with our usual use of the word ‘research’. You could, in principle, do 
scientific, literary, or historical research without writing anything down. Moreover, if 
documentation can turn non-research into research, this undermines the ’material thinking’ 
justification for practice-as-research: if we take this line seriously, then compositional knowledge-
how would not be amenable to translation into knowledge-that. This is a far cry from Pace’s 
insistence on ‘explicit articulation to facilitate integration into academic structures’.20
Nowhere do I suggest that composers should never be asked to write words about their music; 
merely that if the burden placed upon those words is to demonstrate that the music itself is a kind 
of research, the result will often be nonsense, or will at best present a distorted view of what is 
important about the piece. Pace’s suggestion that composition is somehow a less demanding 
activity for an academic to undertake, and that it needs the words to make up the difference, 
hardly warrants a response and has no bearing on the question at hand.  His idea that 21
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accompanying texts of this kind have the function of justifying public subsidy of composition is 
also questionable. I am not convinced that the level of the individual piece of music is the right 
place for this justification to happen; more importantly, the idea that anyone with doubts about 
public subsidy will be won over with a research narrative is far-fetched.
Pace seems to think that without such an accompanying text, composing becomes merely a matter 
of composers composing ‘in the way they always have done’.  This points, perhaps, to a tendency 22
to dismiss any idea of a domain of irreducible non-conceptual thought as some kind of romantic 
fantasy of ineffability. I have no problem with ‘opening a window’ on the compositional process, 
but when this is anything but superficial, it is often poetic and rarely in the language of aims and 
objectives; nor is it a matter of ‘making explicit’ for the purposes of ‘integration’, as Pace puts it. 
Amenability to such language does not, as we have seen, turn something into research; but in any 
case, much of what makes music meaningful is generally resistant to such ‘integration’. The 
originality of an individual piece often lies in the non-systematic accumulation and interaction of 
expectation-defying particulars: startling dissonances (or consonances), tonal implications, a voice 
entering a moment earlier than expected, a moment of fragility, a strangely unbalanced phrase, the 
subtle warping of a familiar shape, the particular grain of an electronic sound. Pointing this out is 
not work-avoidance, it’s just what music is like.
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